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The nature of prosociality in chimpanzees
Claudio Tennie1, Keith Jensen2 & Josep Call3,4
An important debate centres around the nature of prosociality in nonhuman primates.
Chimpanzees help other individuals in some experimental settings, yet they do not readily
share food. One solution to this paradox is that they are motivated to help others provided
there are no competing interests. However, beneﬁts to recipients could arise as by-products
of testing. Here we report two studies that separate by-product from intended helping in
chimpanzees using a GO/NO-GO paradigm. Actors in one group could help a recipient by
releasing a food box, but the same action for another group prevented a recipient from being
able to get food. We ﬁnd no evidence for helping—chimpanzees engaged in the test
regardless of the effects on their partners. Illusory prosocial behaviour could arise as a
by-product of task design.
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T
he evolution of behaviour directed at improving
the welfare of unrelated individuals, especially when these
behaviours are costly for the actor, is an evolutionary
puzzle. Although the main conundrum comes from behaviours
that decrease an actor’s ﬁtness (biological altruism), low-cost
behaviours that beneﬁt others are also an anomaly. Typically,
non-kin targeted helping is explained by mutualism, reciprocity,
policing and reputation which, over the long run, are likely
to increase the actor’s ﬁtness1. Equally puzzling are the
motivations underlying prosocial acts. An act is considered
prosocial if it is intended to beneﬁt others2. This distinguishes
genuine acts of prosociality such as helping from self-serving
alternatives where beneﬁts to others arise as incidental
by-products. To understand the nature and evolutionary origins
of prosocial behaviour, recent work has probed social behaviours
to determine their possible underlying psychological mechanisms.
More speciﬁcally, researchers have focused on whether prosocial
acts are motivated to foster the welfare of others or instead
have a more self-serving nature.
Owing in part to their complex social life, nonhuman primates,
and chimpanzees in particular, have been the focus of intense
scrutiny with regard to the psychological mechanisms underlying
prosocial acts. A number of candidates for prosocial behaviour
have been observed in the wild. Chimpanzees risk injury by going
on border patrols, come to the aid of each other in conﬂicts,
afﬁliate with victims of conﬂicts, groom each other and share
food3–6. Even more spectacular examples of potential prosocial
behaviour have also been observed, such as adoption of orphans
and anecdotal accounts of rescues7–9. However, it is difﬁcult to
infer intentions from observations alone, particularly anecdotes10.
Chimpanzees and other nonhuman primates can receive
immediate or delayed beneﬁts from their actions, calling
into question whether they have the goal of improving the
welfare of others. Grooming can be reciprocated and can be
immediately beneﬁcial for the groomer who experiences reduced
stress as well as beneﬁts from the parasites they eat11–14.
Consoled individuals do not appear to experience reduced
stress but consolers beneﬁt by receiving less redirected
aggression15,16. The beneﬁts of border patrols and coalitions,
like cooperative hunting, are shared, making these mutualistic
interactions. Adoptions typically come long after the orphans
lost their mothers8. Food transfers tend to be done in response
to harassment and begging (manipulation) although active
transfers do occur3,17,18.
To address the underlying motivations of apparently prosocial
acts, experiments are done in captivity. The experiments fall
into two types, sharing and helping. In sharing experiments,
subjects typically choose between an outcome that beneﬁts both
themselves and a partner or themselves only (mutualistic
preference tasks), or between an outcome that beneﬁts a
conspeciﬁc or no one (altruistic preference tasks). In tasks that
involve a food delivery apparatus, chimpanzees rarely transfer
food to each other even when there is no cost to doing so19–24.
A token exchange paradigm involving interactions with human
experimenters showed stronger evidence for prosocial
preferences25, but overall, evidence for food transfers in
chimpanzees is weak. Cooperatively breeding monkeys transfer
food more often and there has been some evidence from other
nonhuman primates, but results are mixed19,26–31. The strongest
evidence for prosocial behaviour comes from experiments of
instrumental aid (helping) in chimpanzees. Chimpanzees will
hand objects to experimenters who reach for them and will do so
in the absence of immediate food rewards, something that
capuchin monkeys do not do32–34. They also help conspeciﬁcs
by choosing the correct tool to access a reward35, releasing a
door to allow conspeciﬁcs to pass through33 and releasing
food and tokens for partners36. The implication is that sharing
and helping are fundamentally different prosocial behaviours,
with the former failing to elicit prosociality in experiments due
to competitive motivations for food37–39. The ability to infer goals
in others—something that chimpanzees, at least, have been
shown to do in other situations40,41—and the motivation to help
others achieve those goals, have been suggested to have evolved
far earlier than our Homo lineage37–39.
An alternative interpretation is that there is no difference
between the motivation to help and share in chimpanzees and
that apparent prosocial behaviour might arise as a by-product
of self-regarding preferences. An important feature of helping
studies is that subjects might engage with the task due to stimulus
enhancement (the socially inﬂuenced attraction to environmental
features). Stimulus enhancement is an important mechanism
for social learning in chimpanzees; observing another individual
perform an action on an object can motivate the observer to
act on it as well, but without imitating the actions. The same
motivation that underlies social learning in chimpanzees—
namely attraction to a test due to the actions of other
individuals—might also drive apparent prosociality. As well,
prior reward histories might also inﬂuence the results of the task
since in helping studies, subjects ﬁrst perform the task alone
to experience the outcomes themselves; carryover effects could
create expectations of rewards42.
To address the stimulus enhancement hypothesis, we
conducted two experiments on a captive group of chimpanzees
that had previously shown evidence of helping behaviours33,36.
Chimpanzees were assigned to one of two groups. In both
of these, the subjects (actors) had no access to a food box but the
box was accessible to a conspeciﬁc (recipient). Actors could
release a wooden peg. In the GO group, releasing the
peg unlocked the food box, allowing food to be shaken out. Doing
so in the NO-GO group had the opposite effect—it locked
the food box, preventing the recipient from getting food.
If chimpanzees are helpful, actors in the GO group were
expected to release the peg more often than the NO-GO group
in both experiments. Alternatively, if chimpanzees are spiteful—
or competitively motivated by food—they would show the reverse
pattern43,44. A lack of a difference between the behaviour
of chimpanzees in the GO and NO-GO groups would lend
support to the stimulus enhancement hypothesis and thus call
into question the nature of prosocial behaviour in chimpanzees.
Actors were ﬁrst tested without prior experience with the
food box (experiment 1). This is an important innovation; all
prior apparatus-based experiments on nonhuman primate
prosociality have trained subjects on the contingencies
nonsocially before introducing a test partner20–24,26–31,34–36.
Subjects in these studies are therefore reinforced for some
choices more than others, and these learning effects may carry
over into the tests. Experiment 1 allowed us to determine what
the chimpanzees learned solely through observing the effects of
their actions on conspeciﬁcs. Later, in experiment 2, we provided
them with training as in all other tests of prosociality by giving
them access to the food box prior to testing; in this way, they
learned the consequences of their actions through personal
experience.
The key ﬁnding is that there was no difference between the
two groups of chimpanzees. They were just as likely to release a
peg to prevent access to food (NO-GO group) as they were to
provide access (GO group). Response rates in both groups
declined over time in experiment 1. After personal experience
with the apparatuses, chimpanzees only released the peg when
doing so resulted in them getting food for themselves. Stimulus
enhancement can fully account for apparent prosociality in
chimpanzees; prior evidence for prosocial behaviour may have
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been by-products of experimental designs, producing an illusion
of helping in our closest living relatives.
Results
Experiment 1. In experiment 1, six chimpanzees (3 males,
3 females—mean age 13 years) were randomly assigned to be
actors in the GO group and seven (4 males, 3 females—mean age
13 years) to the NO-GO group (see Supplementary Table 1 for
further details). To minimize the effects of personal relationships,
three male chimpanzees of a similar age range were chosen to be
recipients. None of the chimpanzees were genetically related.
Recipients were individually given experience getting food out of
the food boxes before being paired with the actors. In addition to
the peg connected to the food box (Fig. 1), a distractor rope and
peg were placed in the actor’s room (peg room); actors were also
given a towel soaked in fruit juice. The purpose of the distractors,
which were identical to those used in previous helping
studies33,36, was to lower the rate of peg releasing below ceiling
levels. Each pair was tested across four sessions of four trials each
(see Methods for details).
Actors were no more likely to release the peg to help
the recipient in the GO group as they were to release it to
block recipients’ access to food in the NO-GO group
(exact Mann-Whitney U test, NGO¼ 6, NNO-GO¼ 7, U¼ 17.00,
P¼ 0.628; Fig. 2 and Supplementary Movies 1–3). Chimpanzees
in both groups initially released the peg at high rates (83% in GO
and 86% in NO-GO), but quickly declined to do so in subsequent
trials (Spearman’s rho: GO rs¼  0.822, N¼ 16, Po0.001;
NO-GO rs¼  0.703, N¼ 16, P¼ 0.002). Both groups
showed a typical extinction curve consistent with lack of
reinforcement, along with ‘spikes’ at the start of each session
(spontaneous recovery of stimulus attraction). In sum, chimpan-
zees in experiment 1 did not behave in a manner consistent
with prosocially motivated helping: actors did not appear to
intend the social outcomes that resulted from their actions and
any social consequences did not appear to be intrinsically
rewarding.
To determine what the actors understood of the effects of
their choices in experiment 1, they were given a post-test
knowledge probe (one session of four trials). Actors started in the
peg room. Actors could access the food box (that is, the food
room) via a raceway that connected both rooms. This control
followed experiment 1, rather than preceded it, to test for any
unintended learning effects on part of the actors (namely being
personally rewarded for certain actions). During this knowledge
probe, actors resumed peg releases, even in the NO-GO group
for which this action was not personally beneﬁcial (25% go,
61% NO-GO). While there was no signiﬁcant difference between
the two groups (exact Mann-Whitney U test, NGO¼ 6,
NNO–GO¼ 7, U¼ 8.00, P¼ 0.073), there was a trend for more
releases by the NO-GO group, for whom releasing was not even
personally beneﬁcial—actors in experiment 1 seemed to have
failed to understand the affordances of the apparatuses by
observing the effects on a conspeciﬁc.
Experiment 2. Actors were then given training sessions in
which they individually learned about the respective food boxes’
affordances. This is the approach taken by almost all previous
studies on sharing and helping20–24,26–31,34–36. As in the previous
knowledge probe, actors could move through the raceway from
the peg room to the food room to access the food box. They were
required to either release the peg before shaking the food box
(GO group) or to inhibit releasing before shaking (NO-GO
group). The criterion for success was to get food out
of the food box in at least three consecutive trials. All but two
actors (two chimpanzees in the NO-GO group) passed and
were then given another knowledge probe. The training
clearly improved understanding: actors in the GO group
now released the peg 96% of the time and those in the NO-GO
group never did so (0%; Fig. 3b). Following this, actors were
a
b
Figure 1 | Experimental apparatuses and setup. (a) Chimpanzees in the
GO group (blue food box on left) could release a peg, allowing food to be
shaken out, whereas those in the NO-GO group (green food box on right)
would prevent food from being shaken out. (b) In the test conditions,
recipients would sit in front of the food box (left of image) and actors would
face them across a keeper’s corridor (right); the peg was attached to the
mesh of the actor’s room (right).
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Figure 2 | Results of experiment 1. Across four sessions, actors in both the
GO group (blue, open circles) and NO-GO group (green, closed circles)
showed a decline in the percentage of trials in which they released the peg.
At the start of each session (dashed line) there is a spike in performance
consistent with spontaneous recovery.
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again placed into the peg room and were again either paired
with recipients in the food room (test trials—three sessions
of four trials each) or with partners in an unconnected
neighbouring room (testing for mere social presence effects:
social control—three sessions of four trials each). Release rates
in these test and control trials of experiment 2 were even lower
than in experiment 1 (Fig. 3a). In the test trials, there was no
difference in peg release between the GO and NO-GO group
(exact Mann-Whitney U test, NGO¼ 6, NNO-GO¼ 5, U¼ 13.5,
P¼ 0.792). Furthermore, there was no difference in peg release
between the test and social control for these two groups
(GO, Wilcoxon exact test: z¼ 8, N¼ 6, P¼ 0.892; NO-GO
group, Wilcoxon exact test: z¼ 3, N¼ 5, P¼ 1; Fig. 3b).
Following experiment 2, actors were given post-test knowledge
probes, where they again demonstrated a clear understanding
of the contingencies of the test: in the GO group actors
always released the peg while the actors of the NO-GO group
never did.
The results from these two experiments—in conjunction
with the data from the knowledge probes—demonstrate
that chimpanzees did not act to produce beneﬁts for others in a
helping context. Chimpanzees did not take into account the
social consequences of their actions, even after having learned
personally about the outcomes of their actions. Any beneﬁts
or harm to conspeciﬁcs that arose did so as incidental
by-products of a personal interest in the stimulus, leading to
the peg release actions. Actors showed an initial interest in
the task (possibly even independent of social effects) which
was quickly extinguished due to lack of reinforcement.
Chimpanzees did not show any evidence for being motivated
to inﬂuence outcomes that beneﬁtted or harmed others.
Discussion
The instrumental helping experiments presented here showed
that chimpanzees will actively ‘help’ conspeciﬁcs by performing
a low-cost action that allows them access to food. However,
they are just as likely to perform the same action when the effect
is to prevent conspeciﬁcs from getting food. Chimpanzees, then,
are no more prosocial than they are spiteful. Furthermore,
regardless of outcomes for their partners, chimpanzees show a
rapid decline in engaging with the task. Personal experience
with the task only increases performance if the actors beneﬁt
personally from their actions. Chimpanzees do demonstrate
an understanding of the consequences of their actions, but
are indifferent to any effects on others.
These ﬁndings reconcile studies in which chimpanzees did
not show signs of prosociality with those that did, and highlight
the similarities between helping and sharing. In studies of active
food sharing, chimpanzees failed to show a preference for
prosocial outcomes when given a choice between outcomes that
beneﬁtted a conspeciﬁc from those that did not19–22,30. Some
studies did report evidence for food sharing24,25,31. However,
prosocial choices occurred at a fairly low rate, raising questions
about how prosocial the subjects were. More critically, each of
these studies is open to alternative explanations. In House et al.24,
chimpanzees only showed weakly prosocial choices in a GO
paradigm in which there was only one piece of food that could be
delivered despite showing no prosocial preferences in other
conditions. In a series of experiments by Claidiere et al.31
chimpanzees were faced with paired choices, one of which was
mutually beneﬁcial and one which was purely selﬁsh; results were
inconsistent and subjects failed knowledge controls. Perhaps the
strongest positive evidence for sharing in an experiment comes
from Horner et al.25 However, in this token exchange study, in
which subjects preferred to exchange coloured tokens with an
experimenter for wrapped food for both themselves and a
partner, the results can be explained by a conditioned preference
for the sound of food being unwrapped45; furthermore, there
were no controls for task comprehension.
Instrumental helping studies in chimpanzees have shown more
consistent evidence for prosociality, but here as well, alternative
explanations have not been ruled out. First, the distinction
between helping and sharing is not as clear-cut as has been
suggested37–39. All instrumental helping studies with conspeciﬁc
recipients involved delivering food or the means to get
food33,35,36,46–48, blurring the distinction between sharing and
helping. In the one direct test comparing prosociality rates when
food or non-food items were delivered, there was no difference,
showing that food delivery does not speciﬁcally impede prosocial
behaviour36. The most highly cited evidence for helping in
chimpanzee comes from experiments in which subjects hand
objects back to human experimenters32,33. However, the
chimpanzees had prior experience with handing objects back to
their caregivers and were reinforced intermittently for this
behaviour. A variable reinforcement schedule such as this
produces persistent responding and it is not surprising that it
generalized to a similar context in testing. Even though the
behaviour of handing objects to humans was not intentionally
trained for those studies, the prior learning history of the subjects
has to be taken into consideration. When training is an explicit
part of the experimental procedure, caution is needed in
interpreting the results. In one study, chimpanzees that had
been trained in symbolic use transferred food to their partners49.
However, explicit training through standard shaping and training
100
100
75
50
25
0
Probe 1 Probe 2
Condition
Test Social
control
80
60
40
20
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
R
el
ea
se
 (%
)
R
el
ea
se
 (%
)
Trial
a
b
Figure 3 | Results of experiment 2. (a) In the test conditions, chimpanzees
in the GO group (blue) and NO-GO group (green) released the peg at low
rates across the three sessions of four trials. (b) Release rates for actors
in the GO group were at ceiling in the pre-test (probe 1) and post-test
(probe 2) knowledge probes, whereas NO-GO group actors never released
the peg (mean±s.e.m.). Release rates—for both groups—were very low in
both the test and social control.
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produced similar results in pigeons50, highlighting the
importance of ﬂexible behaviours in response to novel
circumstances35. Other, more recent, helping studies35,36,46,48,51
can be explained by social tool use (giving a tool to a partner to
get food for oneself), responding to solicitation (begging), or
task persistence whenever food was visible, calling into question
prosocial motivations.
One suggestion for the inconsistent evidence for prosociality
in chimpanzees is that they are too competitive and that
other species might be better models. Bonobos, which are as
closely related to humans as are chimpanzees, have been
suggested as having a more peaceful temperament52. Evidence
for prosocial preferences has come from studies in which they
open doors for conspeciﬁcs allowing them to co-feed53,54.
However, when given prosocial preference tasks as used
in chimpanzees, there has been no evidence for active food
sharing in bonobos19,55. In the only test of instrumental helping
in bonobos, there was no evidence of prosociality, with only
the relatively solitary orangutans handing tools to distressed
partners47. Other non-Pan ape species have shown no signs
of sharing19,30,56, evidence in Old World primates has been
mixed, with self-regarding preferences for social contact as
possible explanations for apparent prosociality29,30,57–59. Among
New World primates, capuchin monkeys have not consistently
exhibited prosocial sharing19,31,60–62 although see63,64. They
will ‘help’ humans by passing objects to them in exchange
for food34,65, although they do not transfer objects to
help conspeciﬁcs get food66. The strongest evidence for
prosociality comes from more distantly related New World
monkeys that provide alloparental care for offspring, leading to
the suggestion that cooperative breeding is a key driver for the
evolution of primate prosociality27,28,30,67–68. However, these
results have not been consistently replicated26,69 and various
experimental details such as test order effects and partner
presence cast some doubt on the evidence for sharing in
these primates70 (though see ref. 71). As yet, there have been
no tests of instrumental helping in callitrichines.
Almost all prior food delivery (sharing) and instrumental
helping studies have involved training in which actors ﬁrst
learn through personal experiences the results of their actions.
While helpful in demonstrating that the animals have learned the
task contingencies, this can create an expectation for getting
rewarded in the test context. While it is important to demonstrate
task understanding, this could be done after testing, or between
tests of naı¨ve then trained subjects as done here (ABA design).
By giving chimpanzees the opportunity to observe the
consequences of their actions on others before giving them
personal experience mitigates the food expectation while still
demonstrating task comprehension. Chimpanzees are able to
learn through others by observing them72, so there is no reason
that they could not learn to help, or hinder, others solely on the
basis of observed outcomes.
The difference between studies that ﬁnd evidence for
prosociality in chimpanzees and other primates and those that
do not can be attributed to design features of the experiments.
Experimental setups which contain stimuli that are sufﬁciently
interesting for chimpanzees and other nonhuman primates
initially elicit actions. Once a novel feature of the environment
ceases to be engaging or of personal value, interest in it
diminishes, without any consideration for how this affects
other individuals. If prior studies of chimpanzee prosocial
behaviour that simply presented a single choice (do something
or do nothing) had been designed such that the outcome of an
action was harmful rather than beneﬁcial to a partner,
then chimpanzees might have been considered to be spiteful.
The key strength of the approach taken in our study is that the
same action (release a peg) under the same stimuli (shaking food
box) had two opposing effects. The GO/NO-GO approach is a
more powerful method for teasing apart other-regarding motiva-
tions from self-interest, in contrast to all prior helping studies that
only use a GO design. Stimulus enhancement is one important
determinant of chimpanzees’ apparent prosociality in
experimental settings. By engaging with an interesting or novel
feature of the environment, particularly when doing so has a
history of providing rewards, chimpanzees can beneﬁt others as
incidental by-products. Social beneﬁts can also arise as by-
products if the subject is trying to gain social contact, play with
the partner, signal dominance, respond to harassment and so
on73. Self-interest, rather than concern for the welfare of others,
could explain putative prosocial behaviour in chimpanzees.
It might have been the case that the stakes were too low in the
experiments reported here and that in other contexts—for
example, where peg release might free a conspeciﬁc from
conﬁnement—motivated aid might be elicited. But a general
point highlighted by our studies is that prosocial motivations
cannot be elucidated from prosocial actions without
ﬁrst controlling for intrinsic interest in experimental setup
(for example, by using a GO/NO-GO method). Future studies
on helping, sharing, comforting and informing will have to
directly address the motivational substrate. Thus, even though
chimpanzees have elsewhere shown to recognize something of the
goals of others74, they appear to lack the motivation to see those
goals realized. Studies on chimpanzees and other nonhuman
animals can shed light on the origins of our own prosocial
behaviour and its importance for large-scale nonkin cooperation.
Methods
Experiment 1. We tested 13 chimpanzees with three recipients (16 chimpanzees
overall, see below). These animals were rescued from illegal wildlife trade and kept
at the Ngamba Island Chimpanzee Sanctuary, a forested island in Uganda. The
research was approved and reviewed by the local ethics committee of CSWCT
(Chimpanzee Sanctuary and Wildlife Conservation Trust), the organization
running the Chimpanzee Sanctuary in Uganda, as well as UWA (Ugandan Wildlife
Authorities) and UNCST (Ugandan National Council for Science and Technology).
The chimpanzees live freely on the island, and come in at night to the sleeping
rooms where they were tested in the morning. Participation was voluntary and
after testing the subjects re-joined the rest of the group. They were not food or
water deprived. Subjects had previously participated in studies on cooperation
and helping33,36,75–79, but the current setup involved a novel apparatus. For further
details on the subjects, see Supplementary Table 1. These studies took place in
the summer of 2011.
One subject (recipient) could interact with a Plexiglas box containing food
(food box). A second subject (actor) could not get food from the box in the
test conditions, but could release a wooden peg connected to the box. For one
group of actors, releasing the peg freed the box, allowing the recipient to get
food out by shaking it (GO group). For the other group of actors, doing so locked
the previously functional (that is, food-delivering) box in place so that the food
could no longer be extracted (NO-GO group). During tests, actor and recipient
were in separate rooms of the sleeping area across a 2m wide corridor used by
experimenters and keepers: actors were in the room with peg access (peg room)
and recipients were in the room with food box access (food room). Actors and
recipients could not interact physically, but could see and hear each other, as
well as the entire apparatus (that is, food box and attached peg). The peg and
food rooms were bridged by an overhead ‘raceway’ that was used during
knowledge probes, but which was closed during test and control trials.
The food boxes for both groups of subjects (GO and NO-GO) were Plexiglas
boxes ﬁxed to the outside of the mesh of the recipient’s room. The lower end of
each food box was set 60 cm above the ground. Directly below each food box, a
metal hopper channelled the food into the food room; the experimenter could also
drop food down the hopper directly (Supplementary Fig. 1). Hopper and food box
were both placed directly under the overhead raceway.
The food boxes could be directly accessed by the experimenters, but not
by the subjects. Recipients could get food (shelled peanuts) only indirectly, namely
by shaking the boxes using a chain attached to the bottom that led through
a hole in the Plexiglas food box into the food room. The use of a chain and shaking
boxes was designed to be noisy so as to attract the attention of the actors,
as need for help may have to be signalled through instrumental actions or
communication36. A series of trays inside the boxes limited the rate at which
peanuts cascaded down to the opening at the bottom, necessitating repeated
shaking—thus getting a few peanuts per shake.
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The GO apparatus had a strong, inﬂexible cord running across the corridor to
the peg attached to bars of the peg room. This static cord prevented the GO
box from being shaken. However, once the peg was released, a small rubber cord
attached to a metal angle allowed the food box to be shaken repeatedly, dispensing
food in the food room. The NO-GO apparatus, on the other hand, had a strong
rubber cord running across the corridor to the peg attached to the mesh of the peg
room. This cord allowed the food box to be shaken repeatedly, causing food to
come out—as long as the peg maintained tension on the rubber cord. Once the peg
was released, the NO-GO food box fell ﬂush to mesh of the food room, and could
no longer be shaken (it lacked the small rubber cord of the GO apparatus).
The GO apparatus was marked with blue tape and the NO-GO with green
tape to facilitate coding. There is no reason to believe that these colours had any
inﬂuence on the chimpanzees’ behaviours.
There was no demonstration or familiarization phase for the actors prior to
testing. This was done to avoid any unintended learning effects that could have
come about from actors getting the food themselves. Actors had to learn about the
consequences of their actions during the test trials, but they could easily see across
the corridor, a distance that had been used in a prior helping study36.
During testing, actors and recipients were brought into their respective
rooms (actors into the peg room; recipients into the food room). The doors and
the raceway were closed so that none could access the others’ room or other parts
of the sleeping area during the test. The recipient that each actor started with
was counterbalanced across actors. Following this, recipients were always
exchanged every two trials, in a ﬁxed order (after Asega came Baluku, followed
by Mawa, then Asega, and so on). We kept this order across all studies.
At the start of each trial, actors were given distractor items (towels soaked
in fruit juice) to prevent a ceiling effect for peg releases; also, they were
given a 6m long rope (that served as distractor to reduce random pulling
behaviour); all of these were also done in prior helping studies33,36. Both actors and
recipients were also distracted with single peanuts at the start of each trial to keep
them in position while the peg was placed and the food box baited. The soaked
towel and individual peanuts also served to maintain motivation, particularly for
the actors who received no food rewards during the test.
When the actors were in position away from the apparatus, the experimenter
showed them a handful of about 45 peanuts (a small handful) and then walked
over to bait the food box by pouring the peanuts into the top shelf. He then
placed the peg into the mesh of the actor’s room and then signalled the start of
the trial. All this while, the actor as well as the recipient were kept away from the
apparatus by a human helper each who provided the actor with single peanuts.
The helper aimed to ensure that the actor would observe the baiting of the
food box, but would also ensure that the actor would not leave position
prematurely. Before each trial, both helpers stopped providing single peanuts
to actor and recipient, respectively, then the actor was given the juice-soaked
towel, and then both helpers and the experimenter left the testing area: this was
the start of a trial.
Each trial lasted 60 s regardless of outcome. After the 60 s, the experimenter
blocked the apparatus so that no more food could be released by the recipients.
For each actor there were four sessions with four trials in each session. To maintain
the recipients’ motivation we provided motivational trials: if they did not receive any
food in three successive experimental trials, they were given a motivational trial with a
50% probability of getting food. If after this the recipients again did not receive food in
another experimental trial, they again received a motivational trial. This continued
until recipients received food in an experimental trial. To ensure that these
motivational trials did not interfere with the actors’ motivations and knowledge of the
apparatus, actors were moved out of sight before motivational trials commenced.
After completing the 16 trials of the experimental phase, actors were given
post-test knowledge probes to determine whether they learned about the
effects of their actions on the apparatus through observation. They were given
one session of four trials. Actors started in the peg room; there was no partner in
the food room. Once in position, the door to the overhead raceway was
opened, allowing them access to the food box by traversing over to the food
room. The raceway access was closed after 60 s had passed and subjects were given
an additional 60 s to gather the food from the apparatus. This protocol was
followed whether subjects released the peg or not for both GO and NO-GO
groups, that is, subjects would not necessarily get food, and they could
remain in the peg room if they failed to cross. At the end of the trial (120 s in total),
the experimenter locked the food box and the actor was moved back to the
peg room unless already there (unless all four trails were ﬁnished, upon which
the actor was let go to join the conspeciﬁcs in the outdoor area).
All trials were videotaped with Sony digital cameras. The primary measure
of whether the peg was released or not by the actor was coded live. All
reported tests are two-tailed. Twenty percent of the trials were coded for
reliability by an assistant blind to the study’s design and purpose. Reliability for
whether the peg was released by the actor was excellent (Cohen’s kappa 0.95).
Experiment 2. Eleven chimpanzees from experiment 1 participated as actors in
experiment 2; two from the NO-GO group failed to pass the training phase
(Nkumwa, a female; and Kisembo, a male). The GO group consisted of six indi-
viduals (three males) and the NO-GO group had ﬁve (three males). The same three
chimpanzees were used as recipients (Supplementary Table 1).
The setup and apparatus were the same as in experiment 1. One additional
room was used for a social control condition; here, instead of being in the food
room, the recipient was in a room adjacent to the peg room (that is, a room
without access to either peg or food box). In this way, the recipient was still present
(that is, the control was still social), but unable to interact with the setup.
The overall procedure was the same as in experiment 1. The key difference was
the addition of familiarization/training trials in which the actors directly
experienced the consequences of their actions on the apparatus during the training
phase. Actors were also given knowledge probes before and after testing
to ascertain that they had learned—and remembered—how to use the apparatus to
their personal beneﬁt. Furthermore, actors were also tested in a social control
condition in which the recipient was present and visible, but in a third room in
which they could not interact with the apparatus (see above). The number of
sessions was reduced to three, rather than four, due to testing time constraints. Still,
each session contained four trials (see Supplementary Table 2).
Actors were given the same test apparatus (GO or NO-GO) that they had
interacted with in experiment 1. There were three steps in the training phase, all of
which had to be passed before actors could advance to the testing phase. In step 1,
actors were in the food room. The apparatus was in the same functional state for
both the GO and NO-GO groups (conﬁgured so that shaking it would release
food). The experimenter baited the apparatus with approximately 45 peanuts. One
more peanut was dropped down the hopper so that no initial shaking would
be required to get this one. The purpose of this was to attract the chimpanzees to
the food box. Once the chimpanzee arrived at the food box, they were given a 60 s
trial. They had up to ten trials in a session—with a maximum of two sessions—to
reach criterion level of performance of shaking the food box at least ﬁve times in
each of three successive trials. All subjects—with the exception of one male
(Kisembo)—passed this criterion, and moved on to step 2.
In step 2, actors of both groups started in the food room as before and had 120 s
to shake the food box to get food (it was no longer necessary to drop peanuts down
a hopper to lure them to the food box). The experimenter then placed the peg into
the mesh of the peg room. After the actor had shaken the food box (ﬁve shakes),
the overhead raceway was opened, allowing actors the choice to leave the food
room and go to the peg room to release the peg or not. Actors in the NO-GO group
thus had to inhibit moving over and releasing the peg (since doing so would have
locked the box into position and prevented the food from being accessible).
However, the opening of the raceway allowed subjects from the GO group to make
their food box functional: the GO group actors could move to the peg room, release
the peg there and then go back to the food box to shake food out. As in step 1, there
was a criterion level of performance. Actors had to be able to shake the food box in
its functional state at least ﬁve times in three successive trials within a maximum
of two sessions of ten trials; for the GO group, this meant releasing the peg prior to
shaking, for the NO-GO group, this meant inhibiting releasing of the peg. All 12
remaining actors passed criterion and moved to step 3 of training.
In step 3, having learned to release the peg (GO group) and to inhibit releasing
it (NO-GO group), actors now started the trial in the peg room. The trial began
with the raceway to the recipient’s room locked. Actors were distracted by slowly
handing them peanuts (as in the test phase of experiment 1). As in the test of
experiment 1 they were then shown a handful of peanuts, which was placed into
the food box. The peg was then attached to the mesh of the peg room where the
actor was and the raceway was then opened. GO actors had to release the peg
before passing over the raceway to the food room. NO-GO actors had to instead
inhibit releasing the peg, then to cross the raceway to be able to get food out of the
food boxes. The same criterion as in step 2 applied, and again subjects had a
maximum of two sessions of ten trials to reach criterion. Eleven actors reached
criterion and thus passed the ﬁnal step of training. Only one actor, Nkumwa in the
NO-GO group, failed and was thus excluded from further testing.
The pre-test knowledge probe was the same as the post-test knowledge probe of
experiment 1. Actors had access to the food box in the recipient’s room via a
raceway. There was a single session of four trials.
In the test, actors were given the same apparatus they had used in experiment 1
as well as the training phase of experiment 2. They were paired with recipients as in
experiment 1.
In addition to the test condition with the recipient in the food room (as in
experiment 1), a social control condition had the recipient sitting in the room
adjacent to the peg room, fully visible to the actor. The actor was free to release the
peg in the social control condition, but since the food room was empty, releasing
the peg had no effect on the movement of the food box or consequences for a
conspeciﬁc. The test and social control trials were presented in a blocked design
counterbalanced across actors. That is, actors were given three sessions of each
condition (either social control or test) before switching to the other condition.
There were four trials in each session.
Following the test phase, actors were given four post-test knowledge probe
trials, as described above for the pre-test knowledge probe, to determine whether
they remembered their prior training.
Data coding and analyses were conducted as in experiment 1.
Data availability. All summary data are included in the manuscript and supple-
ment; requests for more detailed data collected for this study are available from the
corresponding author on request.
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